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O ut of print
The death and life of the American newspaper*
The American newspaper has been around for approximately three hundred
years. Benjamin Harris’s spirited Publick Occurrences, Both Forreign and Domestick
managed just one issue, in 1690, before the Massachusetts authorities closed it
down. Harris had suggested a politically incorrect hard line on Indian removal
and shocked local sensibilities by reporting that the King of France had been
taking liberties with the Prince’s wife.
It really was not until 1721, when the printer James Franklin launched the
New England Courant, that any of Britain’s North American colonies saw what
we might recognize today as a real newspaper. Franklin, Benjamin’s older brother,
refused to adhere to customary licensing arrangements and constantly attacked
the ruling powers of New England, thereby achieving both editorial independence
and commercial success. He filled his paper with crusades (on everything from
pirates to the power of Cotton and Increase Mather), literary essays by Addison
and Steele, character sketches, and assorted philosophical ruminations.
Three centuries after the appearance of Franklin’s Courant, it no longer
requires a dystopic imagination to wonder who will have the dubious distinction
of publishing America’s last genuine newspaper. Few believe that newspapers in
their current printed form will survive. Newspaper companies are losing advertisers,
readers, market value, and, in some cases, their sense of mission at a pace that
would have been barely imaginable just four years ago. Bill Keller, the executive
editor of the Times, said recently in a speech in London, “At places where editors
and publishers gather, the mood these days is funereal. Editors ask one another,
‘How are you?,’ in that sober tone one employs with friends who have just
emerged from rehab or a messy divorce.” Keller’s speech appeared on the Web
site of its sponsor, the Guardian, under the headline “NOT DEAD YET.”
Perhaps not, but trends in circulation and advertising––the rise of the Internet,
which has made the daily newspaper look slow and unresponsive; the advent of
Craigslist, which is wiping out classified advertising––have created a palpable
sense of doom. Independent, publicly traded American newspapers have lost
forty-two per cent of their market value in the past three years, according to the
media entrepreneur Alan Mutter. Few corporations have been punished on Wall
Street the way those who dare to invest in the newspaper business have. The
McClatchy Company, which was the only company to bid on the Knight Ridder
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chain when, in 2005, it was put on the auction block, has surrendered more than
eighty per cent of its stock value since making the $6.5-billion purchase. Lee
Enterprises’ stock is down by three-quarters since it bought out the Pulitzer chain,
the same year. America’s most prized journalistic possessions are suddenly looking
like corporate millstones. Rather than compete in an era of merciless transformation,
the families that owned the Los Angeles Times and the Wall Street Journal sold off the
majority of their holdings. The New York Times Company has seen its stock decline
by fifty-four per cent since the end of 2004, with much of the loss coming in the
past year; in late February, an analyst at Deutsche Bank recommended that clients sell
off their Times stock. The Washington Post Company has avoided a similar fate only
by rebranding itself an “education and media company”; its testing and prep company,
Kaplan, now brings in at least half the company’s revenue.
Until recently, newspapers were accustomed to operating as high-margin
monopolies. To own the dominant, or only, newspaper in a mid-sized American
city was, for many decades, a kind of license to print money. In the Internet age,
however, no one has figured out how to rescue the newspaper in the United
States or abroad. Newspapers have created Web sites that benefit from the growth
of online advertising, but the sums are not nearly enough to replace the loss in
revenue from circulation and print ads.
Most managers in the industry have reacted to the collapse of their business
model with a spiral of budget cuts, bureau closings, buyouts, layoffs, and reductions
in page size and column inches. Since 1990, a quarter of all American newspaper
jobs have disappeared. The columnist Molly Ivins complained, shortly before her
death, that the newspaper companies’ solution to their problem was to make
“our product smaller and less helpful and less interesting.” That may help explain
why the dwindling number of Americans who buy and read a daily paper are
spending less time with it; the average is down to less than fifteen hours a month.
Only nineteen per cent of Americans between the ages of eighteen and thirty-
four claim even to look at a daily newspaper. The average age of the American
newspaper reader is fifty-five and rising.
Philip Meyer, in his book “The Vanishing Newspaper” (2004), predicts that
the final copy of the final newspaper will appear on somebody’s doorstep one
day in 2043. It may be unkind to point out that all these parlous trends coincide
with the opening, this spring, of the $450-million Newseum, in Washington, D.C.,
but, more and more, what Bill Keller calls “that lovable old-fashioned bundle of
ink and cellulose” is starting to feel like an artifact ready for display under glass.
Taking its place, of course, is the Internet, which is about to pass newspapers
as a source of political news for American readers. For young people, and for the
most politically engaged, it has already done so. As early as May, 2004, newspapers
had become the least preferred source for news among younger people. According
to “Abandoning the News,” published by the Carnegie Corporation, thirty-nine
per cent of respondents under the age of thirty-five told researchers that they
expected to use the Internet in the future for news purposes; just eight per cent
said that they would rely on a newspaper. It is a point of ironic injustice, perhaps,
that when a reader surfs the Web in search of political news he frequently ends
up at a site that is merely aggregating journalistic work that originated in a
newspaper, but that fact is not likely to save any newspaper jobs or increase
papers’ stock valuation.
Among the most significant aspects of the transition from “dead tree”
newspapers to a world of digital information lies in the nature of “news” itself.
The American newspaper (and the nightly newscast) is designed to appeal to a
broad audience, with conflicting values and opinions, by virtue of its commitment
to the goal of objectivity. Many newspapers, in their eagerness to demonstrate a
sense of balance and impartiality, do not allow reporters to voice their opinions
publicly, march in demonstrations, volunteer in political campaigns, wear political
buttons, or attach bumper stickers to their cars.
In private conversation, reporters and editors concede that objectivity is an
ideal, an unreachable horizon, but journalists belong to a remarkably thin-skinned
fraternity, and few of them will publicly admit to betraying in print even a trace of
bias. They discount the notion that their beliefs could interfere with their ability
to report a story with perfect balance. As the venerable “dean” of the Washington
press corps, David Broder, of the Post, puts it, “There just isn’t enough ideology in
the average reporter to fill a thimble.”
Meanwhile, public trust in newspapers has been slipping at least as quickly
as the bottom line. A recent study published by Sacred Heart University found
that fewer than twenty per cent of Americans said they could believe “all or
most” media reporting, a figure that has fallen from more than twenty-seven per
cent just five years ago. “Less than one in five believe what they read in print,” the
2007 “State of the News Media” report, issued by the Project for Excellence in
Journalism, concluded. “CNN is not really more trusted than Fox, or ABC than
NBC. The local paper is not viewed much differently than the New York Times.”
Vastly more Americans believe in flying saucers and 9/11 conspiracy theories
than believe in the notion of balanced—much less “objective”—mainstream news
media. Nearly nine in ten Americans, according to the Sacred Heart study, say
that the media consciously seek to influence public policies, though they disagree
about whether the bias is liberal or conservative.
No less challenging is the rapid transformation that has taken place in the
public’s understanding of, and demand for, “news” itself. Rupert Murdoch, in a
speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, in April, 2005—two years
before his five-billion-dollar takeover of Dow Jones & Co. and the Wall Street
Journal—warned the industry’s top editors and publishers that the days when
“news and information were tightly controlled by a few editors, who deigned to
tell us what we could and should know,” were over. No longer would people
accept “a godlike figure from above” presenting the news as “gospel.” Today’s
consumers “want news on demand, continuously updated. They want a point of
view about not just what happened but why it happened. . . . And finally, they
want to be able to use the information in a larger community—to talk about, to
debate, to question, and even to meet people who think about the world in
similar or different ways.”
One month after Murdoch’s speech, a thirty-one-year-old computer whiz,
Jonah Peretti, and a former A.O.L. executive, Kenneth Lerer, joined the ubiquitous
commentator-candidate-activist Arianna Huffington to launch a new Web site,
which they called the Huffington Post. First envisaged as a liberal alternative to
the Drudge Report, the Huffington Post started out by aggregating political news
and gossip; it also organized a group blog, with writers drawn largely from
Huffington’s alarmingly vast array of friends and connections. Huffington had
accumulated that network during years as a writer on topics from Greek philosophy
to the life of Picasso, as the spouse of a wealthy Republican congressman in
California, and now, after a divorce and an ideological conversion, as a Los
Angeles-based liberal commentator and failed gubernatorial candidate.
Almost by accident, however, the owners of the Huffington Post had
discovered a formula that capitalized on the problems confronting newspapers
in the Internet era, and they are convinced that they are ready to reinvent the
American newspaper. “Early on, we saw that the key to this enterprise was not
aping Drudge,” Lerer recalls. “It was taking advantage of our community. And the
key was to think of what we were doing through the community’s eyes.”
On the Huffington Post, Peretti explains, news is not something handed
down from above but “a shared enterprise between its producer and its consumer.”
Echoing Murdoch, he says that the Internet offers editors “immediate information”
about which stories interest readers, provoke comments, are shared with friends,
and generate the greatest number of Web searches. An Internet-based news site,
Peretti contends, is therefore “alive in a way that is impossible for paper and ink.”
Though Huffington has a news staff (it is tiny, but the hope is to expand in
the future), the vast majority of the stories that it features originate elsewhere,
whether in print, on television, or on someone’s video camera or cell phone. The
editors link to whatever they believe to be the best story on a given topic. Then
they repurpose it with a catchy, often liberal-leaning headline and provide a
comment section beneath it, where readers can chime in. Surrounding the news
articles are the highly opinionated posts of an apparently endless army of both
celebrity (Nora Ephron, Larry David) and non-celebrity bloggers—more than eighteen
hundred so far. The bloggers are not paid. The over-all effect may appear chaotic
and confusing, but, Lerer argues, “this new way of thinking about, and presenting,
the news, is transforming news as much as CNN did thirty years ago.” Arianna
Huffington and her partners believe that their model points to where the news
business is heading. “People love to talk about the death of newspapers, as if it’s
a foregone conclusion. I think that’s ridiculous,” she says. “Traditional media just
need to realize that the online world isn’t the enemy. In fact, it’s the thing that will
save them, if they fully embrace it .”
It’s an almost comically audacious ambition for an operation with only
forty-six full-time employees—many of whom are barely old enough to rent a car.
But, with about eleven million dollars at its disposal, the site is poised to break
even on advertising revenue of somewhere between six and ten million dollars
annually. What most impresses advertisers—and depresses newspaper-company
executives—is the site’s growth numbers. In the past thirty days, thanks in large
measure to the excitement of the Democratic primaries, the site’s “unique visitors”—
that is, individual computers that clicked on one of its pages––jumped to more
than eleven million, according to the company. And, according to estimates from
Nielsen NetRatings and comScore, the Huffington Post is more popular than all
but eight newspaper sites, rising from sixteenth place in December.
Arthur Miller once described a good newspaper as “a nation talking to
itself.” If only in this respect, the Huffington Post is a great newspaper. It is not
unusual for a short blog post to inspire a thousand posts from readers—posts that go
off in their own directions and lead to arguments and conversations unrelated to the
topic that inspired them. Occasionally, these comments present original perspectives
and arguments, but many resemble the graffiti on a bathroom wall.
The notion that the Huffington Post is somehow going to compete with,
much less displace, the best traditional newspapers is arguable on other grounds
as well. The site’s original-reporting resources are minuscule. The site has no
regular sports or book coverage, and its entertainment section is a trashy grab
bag of unverified Internet gossip. And, while the Huffington Post has successfully
positioned itself as the place where progressive politicians and Hollywood liberal
luminaries post their anti-Bush Administration sentiments, many of the original
blog posts that it publishes do not merit the effort of even a mouse click.
Additional oddities abound. Whereas a newspaper tends to stand by its
story on the basis of an editorial process in which professional reporters and
editors attempt to vet their sources and check their accuracy before publishing,
the blogosphere relies on its readership—its community—for quality control. At
the Huffington Post, Jonah Peretti explains, the editors “stand behind our front
page” and do their best to insure that only trusted bloggers and reliable news
sources are posted there. Most posts inside the site, however, go up before an
editor sees them. Only if a post is deemed by a reader to be false, defamatory, or
offensive does an editor get involved.
The Huffington Post’s editorial processes are based on what Peretti has
named the “mullet strategy.” (“Business up front, party in the back” is how his trend-
spotting site BuzzFeed glosses it.) “User-generated content is all the rage, but most of
it totally sucks,” Peretti says. The mullet strategy invites users to “argue and vent on the
secondary pages, but professional editors keep the front page looking sharp. The
mullet strategy is here to stay, because the best way for Web companies to increase
traffic is to let users have control, but the best way to sell advertising is a slick, pretty
front page where corporate sponsors can admire their brands.”
This policy is hardly without its pitfalls. During the Hurricane Katrina crisis,
the activist Randall Robinson referred, in a post, to reports from New Orleans that
some people there were “eating corpses to survive.” When Arianna Huffington
heard about the post, she got in touch with Robinson and found that he could
not support his musings; she asked Robinson to post a retraction. The alacrity
with which the correction took place was admirable, but it was not fast enough
to prevent the false information from being repeated elsewhere.
The tensions between the leaders of the mainstream media and the
challengers from the Web were presaged by one of the most instructive and
heated intellectual debates of the American twentieth century.
Between 1920 and 1925, the young Walter Lippmann published three
books investigating the theoretical relationship between democracy and the press,
including “Public Opinion” (1922), which is credited with inspiring both the
public-relations profession and the academic field of media studies. Lippmann
identified a fundamental gap between what we naturally expect from democracy
and what we know to be true about people. Democratic theory demands that
citizens be knowledgeable about issues and familiar with the individuals put
forward to lead them. And, while these assumptions may have been reasonable
for the white, male, property-owning classes of James Franklin’s Colonial Boston,
contemporary capitalist society had, in Lippmann’s view, grown too big and
complex for crucial events to be mastered by the average citizen.
Journalism works well, Lippmann wrote, when “it can report the score of a
game or a transatlantic flight, or the death of a monarch.” But where the situation
is more complicated, “as for example, in the matter of the success of a policy, or
the social conditions among a foreign people—that is to say, where the real
answer is neither yes or no, but subtle, and a matter of balanced evidence,”
journalism “causes no end of derangement, misunderstanding, and even
misrepresentation.”
Lippmann likened the average American—or “outsider,” as he tellingly named
him—to a “deaf spectator in the back row” at a sporting event: “He does not know
what is happening, why it is happening, what ought to happen,” and “he lives in
a world which he cannot see, does not understand and is unable to direct.” In a
description that may strike a familiar chord with anyone who watches cable
news or listens to talk radio today, Lippmann assumed a public that “is slow to
be aroused and quickly diverted . . . and is interested only when events have been
melodramatized as a conflict.” A committed élitist, Lippmann did not see why
anyone should find these conclusions shocking. Average citizens are hardly
expected to master particle physics or post-structuralism. Why should we expect
them to understand the politics of Congress, much less that of the Middle East?
Lippmann’s preferred solution was, in essence, to junk democracy entirely.
He justified this by arguing that the results were what mattered. Even “if there were
a prospect” that people could become sufficiently well-informed to govern
themselves wisely, he wrote, “it is extremely doubtful whether many of us would
wish to be bothered.” In his first attempt to consider the issue, in “Liberty and the
News” (1920), Lippmann suggested addressing the problem by raising the status
of journalism to that of more respected professions. Two years later, in “Public
Opinion,” he concluded that journalism could never solve the problem merely
by “acting upon everybody for thirty minutes in twenty-four hours.” Instead, in
one of the oddest formulations of his long career, Lippmann proposed the
creation of “intelligence bureaus,” which would be given access to all the
information they needed to judge the government’s actions without concerning
themselves much with democratic preferences or public debate. Just what, if any,
role the public would play in this process Lippmann never explained.
John Dewey termed “Public Opinion” “perhaps the most effective indictment
of democracy as currently conceived ever penned,” and he spent much of the
next five years countering it. The result, published in 1927, was an extremely
tendentious, dense, yet important book, titled “The Public and Its Problems.”
Dewey did not dispute Lippmann’s contention regarding journalism’s flaws or
the public’s vulnerability to manipulation. But Dewey thought that Lippmann’s
cure was worse than the disease. While Lippmann viewed public opinion as little
more than the sum of the views of each individual, much like a poll, Dewey saw
it more like a focus group. The foundation of democracy to Dewey was less
information than conversation. Members of a democratic society needed to
cultivate what the journalism scholar James W. Carey, in describing the debate,
called “certain vital habits” of democracy—the ability to discuss, deliberate on,
and debate various perspectives in a manner that would move it toward consensus.
Dewey also criticized Lippmann’s trust in knowledge-based élites. “A class
of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class
with private interests and private knowledge,” he argued. “The man who wears the
shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker
is the best judge of how the trouble is to be remedied.”
Lippmann and Dewey devoted much of the rest of their lives to addressing
the problems they had diagnosed, Lippmann as the archetypal insider pundit and
Dewey as the prophet of democratic education. To the degree that posterity can
be said to have declared a winner in this argument, the future turned out much
closer to Lippmann’s ideal. Dewey’s confidence in democracy rested in significant
measure on his “faith in the capacity of human beings for intelligent judgment
and action if proper conditions are furnished.” But nothing in his voluminous
writings gives the impression that he believed these conditions—which he defined
expansively to include democratic schools, factories, voluntary associations, and,
particularly, newspapers—were ever met in his lifetime. (Dewey died in 1952, at
the age of ninety-two.)
The history of the American press demonstrates a tendency toward exactly
the kind of professionalization for which Lippmann initially argued. When Lippmann
was writing, many newspapers remained committed to the partisan model of the
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American press, in which editors and publishers
viewed themselves as appendages of one or another political power or patronage
machine and slanted their news offerings accordingly. (Think of Thomas Jefferson
and Alexander Hamilton battling each other through their competing newspapers
while serving in George Washington’s Cabinet .) The twentieth-century model, in
which newspapers strive for political independence and attempt to act as referees
between competing parties on behalf of what they perceive to be the public
interest, was, in Lippmann’s time, in its infancy.
As the profession grew more sophisticated and respected, in part owing to
Lippmann’s example, top reporters, anchors, and editors naturally rose in status
to the point where some came to be considered the social equals of the senators,
Cabinet secretaries, and C.E.O.s they reported on. Just as naturally, these same
reporters and editors sometimes came to identify with their subjects, rather than
with their readers, as Dewey had predicted. Aside from biennial elections featuring
smaller and smaller portions of the electorate, politics increasingly became a business
for professionals and a spectator sport for the great unwashed—much as Lippmann
had hoped and Dewey had feared. Beyond the publication of the occasional letter to
the editor, the role of the reader was defined as purely passive.
The Lippmann model received its initial challenge from the political right.
Many conservatives regarded the major networks, newspapers, and newsweeklies—
the mainstream media—as liberal arbiters, incapable of covering without bias the
civil-rights movement in the South or Barry Goldwater’s Presidential campaign.
They responded by building think tanks and media outlets designed both to
challenge and to bypass the mainstream media. The Reagan revolution, which
brought conservatives to power in Washington, had its roots not only in the
candidate’s personal appeal as a “great communicator” but in a decades-long
campaign of ideological spadework undertaken in magazines such as William F.
Buckley, Jr.,’s National Review and Norman Podhoretz’s Commentary and in the
pugnacious editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal, edited for three decades by
Robert Bartley. The rise of what has come to be known as the conservative
“counter-establishment” and, later, of media phenomena such as Rush Limbaugh,
on talk radio, and Bill O’Reilly, on cable television, can be viewed in terms of a
Deweyan community attempting to seize the reins of democratic authority and
information from a Lippmann-like élite.
A liberal version of the Deweyan community took longer to form, in part
because it took liberals longer to find fault with the media. Until the late nineteen-
seventies, many in the mainstream media did, in fact, exhibit the “liberal bias”
with which conservatives continue to charge them, regarding their unquestioned
belief both in a strong, activist government and in its moral responsibility to
insure the expansion of rights to women and to ethnic and racial minorities. But
a concerted effort to recruit pundits from the new conservative counter-
establishment, coupled with investment by wealthy right-wing activists and
businessmen in an interlocking web of counter-establishment think tanks, pressure
groups, periodicals, radio stations, and television networks, operated as a kind of
rightward gravitational pull on the mainstream’s reporting and helped to create a
far more sympathetic context for conservative candidates than Goldwater supporters
could have imagined.
Duncan Black, a former economics professor who writes a popular progressive
blog under the name Atrios, explains that he, too, believed in what he calls “the myth
of the liberal media.” He goes on, “But watching the press’s collective behavior during
the Clinton impeachment saga, the Gore campaign, the post-9/11 era, the run-up to
the Iraq war, and the Bush Administration’s absurd and dangerous claims of executive
power rendered such a belief absurd. Sixty-five per cent of the American public
disapproves of the Bush Administration, but that perspective, even now, has very little
representation anywhere in the mainstream media.”
The birth of the liberal blogosphere, with its ability to bypass the big media
institutions and conduct conversations within a like-minded community, represents
a revival of the Deweyan challenge to our Lippmann-like understanding of what
constitutes “news” and, in doing so, might seem to revive the philosopher’s
notion of a genuinely democratic discourse. The Web provides a powerful platform
that enables the creation of communities; distribution is frictionless, swift, and
cheap. The old democratic model was a nation of New England towns filled
with well-meaning, well-informed yeoman farmers. Thanks to the Web, we can all
join in a Deweyan debate on Presidents, policies, and proposals. All that’s
necessary is a decent Internet connection.
What put the Huffington Post on the map was a series of pieces during the
summer and autumn of 2005, in which Arianna Huffington relentlessly attacked
the military and foreign-affairs reporting of the Times’ Judith Miller. Huffington
was fed by a steady stream of leaks and suggestions from Times editors and
reporters, even though much of the newspaper world considered her journalistic
credentials highly questionable.
The Huffington Post was hardly the first Web site to stumble on the technique
of leveraging the knowledge of its readers to challenge the mainstream media
narrative. For example, conservative bloggers at sites like Little Green Footballs
took pleasure in helping to bring down Dan Rather after he broadcast dubious
documents allegedly showing that George W. Bush had received special treatment
during his service in the Texas Air National Guard.
Long before the conservatives forced out Dan Rather, a liberal freelance
journalist named Joshua Micah Marshall had begun a site, called Talking Points
Memo, intended to take stories well beyond where mainstream newspapers had
taken them, often by relying on the voluntary research and well-timed leaks of an
avid readership. His site, begun during the 2000 Florida-recount controversy,
ultimately spawned several related sites, which are collectively known as TPM
Media, and which are financed through a combination of reader donations and
advertising. In the admiring judgment of the Columbia Journalism Review, Talking
Points Memo “was almost single-handedly responsible for bringing the story of
the fired U.S. Attorneys to a boil,” a scandal that ultimately ended with the
resignation of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and a George Polk Award for
Marshall, the first ever for a blogger. Talking Points Memo also played a lead role
in defeating the Bush Social Security plan and in highlighting Trent Lott’s praise
for Strom Thurmond’s 1948 segregationist Presidential campaign. Lott was
eventually forced to step down as Senate Majority Leader.
According to Marshall, “the collaborative aspect” of his site “came about
entirely by accident.” His original intention was merely to offer his readers
“transparency,” so that his “strong viewpoint” would be distinguishable from the
facts that he presented. Over time, however, he found that the enormous response
that his work engendered offered access to “a huge amount of valuable
information”––information that was not always available to mainstream reporters,
who tended to deal largely with what Marshall terms “professional sources.”
During the Katrina crisis, for example, Marshall discovered that some of his
readers worked in the federal government’s climate-and-weather-tracking
infrastructure. They provided him and the site with reliable reporting available
nowhere else.
Marshall’s undeniable achievement notwithstanding, traditional newspaper
men and women tend to be unimpressed by the style of journalism practiced at
the political Web sites. Operating on the basis of a Lippmann-like reverence for
inside knowledge and contempt for those who lack it, many view these sites the
way serious fiction authors might view the “novels” tapped out by Japanese
commuters on their cell phones. Real reporting, especially the investigative kind,
is expensive, they remind us. Aggregation and opinion are cheap.
And it is true: no Web site spends anything remotely like what the best
newspapers do on reporting. Even after the latest round of new cutbacks and
buyouts are carried out, the Times will retain a core of more than twelve hundred
newsroom employees, or approximately fifty times as many as the Huffington
Post. The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times maintain between eight
hundred and nine hundred editorial employees each. The Times’ Baghdad bureau
alone costs around three million dollars a year to maintain. And while the Huffington
Post shares the benefit of these investments, it shoulders none of the costs.
Despite the many failures at newspapers, the vast majority of reporters and
editors have devoted years, even decades, to understanding the subjects of their
stories. It is hard to name any bloggers who can match the professional expertise,
and the reporting, of, for example, the Post ’s Barton Gellman and Dana Priest, or
the Times’ Dexter Filkins and Alissa Rubin.
In October, 2005, at an advertisers’ conference in Phoenix, Bill Keller
complained that bloggers merely “recycle and chew on the news,” contrasting
that with the Times’ emphasis on what he called “a ‘journalism of verification,’ “
rather than mere “assertion.”
“Bloggers are not chewing on the news. They are spitting it out,” Arianna
Huffington protested in a Huffington Post blog. Like most liberal bloggers, she
takes exception to the assumption by so many traditional journalists that their
work is superior to that of bloggers when it comes to ferreting out the truth. The
ability of bloggers to find the flaws in the mainstream media’s reporting of the
Iraq war “highlighted the absurdity of the knee jerk comparison of the relative
credibility of the so-called MSM and the blogosphere,” she said, and went on, “In
the run-up to the Iraq war, many in the mainstream media, including the New
York Times, lost their veneer of unassailable trustworthiness for many readers and
viewers, and it became clear that new media sources could be trusted—and indeed
are often much quicker at correcting mistakes than old media sources.”
But Huffington fails to address the parasitical relationship that virtually all
Internet news sites and blog commentators enjoy with newspapers. The Huffington
Post made a gesture in the direction of original reporting and professionalism
last year when it hired Thomas Edsall, a forty-year veteran of the Washington Post and
other papers, as its political editor. At the time he was approached by the Huffington
Post, Edsall said, he felt that the Post had become “increasingly driven by fear—the fear
of declining readership, the fear of losing advertisers, the fear of diminishing revenues,
the fear of being swamped by the Internet, the fear of irrelevance. Fear drove the paper,
from top to bottom, to corrupt the entire news operation.” Joining the Huffington
Post, Edsall said, was akin to “getting out of jail,” and he has written, ever since, with a
sense of liberation. But such examples are rare.
And so even if one agrees with all of Huffington’s jabs at the Times, and
Edsall’s critique of the Washington Post, it is impossible not to wonder what will
become of not just news but democracy itself, in a world in which we can no longer
depend on newspapers to invest their unmatched resources and professional pride in
helping the rest of us to learn, however imperfectly, what we need to know.
In a recent episode of “The Simpsons,” a cartoon version of Dan Rather
introduced a debate panel featuring “Ron Lehar, a print journalist from the
Washington Post.” This inspired Bart’s nemesis Nelson to shout, “Haw haw! Your
medium is dying!”
“Nelson!” Principal Skinner admonished the boy.
“But it is!” was the young man’s reply.
Nelson is right. Newspapers are dying; the evidence of diminishment in
economic vitality, editorial quality, depth, personnel, and the over-all number of
papers is everywhere. What this portends for the future is complicated. Three years
ago, Rupert Murdoch warned newspaper editors, “Many of us have been remarkably,
unaccountably complacent . . . quietly hoping that this thing called the digital
revolution would just limp along.” Today, almost all serious newspapers are
scrambling to adapt themselves to the technological and community-building
opportunities offered by digital news delivery, including individual blogs, video
reports, and “chat” opportunities for readers. Some, like the Times and the Post,
will likely survive this moment of technological transformation in different form,
cutting staff while increasing their depth and presence online. Others will seek to
focus themselves locally. Newspaper editors now say that they “get it .” Yet traditional
journalists are blinkered by their emotional investment in their Lippmann-like
status as insiders. They tend to dismiss not only most blogosphere-based criticisms
but also the messy democratic ferment from which these criticisms emanate. The
Chicago Tribune recently felt compelled to shut down comment boards on its
Web site for all political news stories. Its public editor, Timothy J. McNulty,
complained, not without reason, that “the boards were beginning to read like a
community of foul-mouthed bigots.”
Arianna Huffington, for her part, believes that the online and the print
newspaper model are beginning to converge: “As advertising dollars continue to
move online—as they slowly but certainly are—HuffPost will be adding more and
more reporting and the Times and Post model will continue with the kinds of
reporting they do, but they’ll do more of it originally online.” She predicts “more
vigorous reporting in the future that will include distributed journalism—wisdom-
of-the-crowd reporting of the kind that was responsible for the exposing of the
Attorneys General firing scandal.” As for what may be lost in this transition, she
is untroubled: “A lot of reporting now is just piling on the conventional wisdom—
with important stories dying on the front page of the New York Times.”
The survivors among the big newspapers will not be without support from
the nonprofit sector. ProPublica, funded by the liberal billionaires Herb and
Marion Sandler and headed by the former Wall Street Journal managing editor
Paul Steiger, hopes to provide the mainstream media with the investigative reporting
that so many have chosen to forgo. The Center for Independent Media, headed
by David Bennahum, a former writer at Wired, recently hired Jefferson Morley,
from the Washington Post, and Allison Silver, a former editor at both the Los
Angeles Times and the New York Times, to oversee a Web site called the Washington
Independent. It’s one of a family of news-blogging sites meant to pick up some
of the slack left by declining staffs in local and Washington reporting, with the
hope of expanding everywhere. But to imagine that philanthropy can fill all the
gaps arising from journalistic cutbacks is wishful thinking.
And so we are about to enter a fractured, chaotic world of news, characterized
by superior community conversation but a decidedly diminished level of first-
rate journalism. The transformation of newspapers from enterprises devoted to
objective reporting to a cluster of communities, each engaged in its own kind of
“news”––and each with its own set of “truths” upon which to base debate and
discussion––will mean the loss of a single national narrative and agreed-upon
set of “facts” by which to conduct our politics. News will become increasingly
“red” or “blue.” This is not utterly new. Before Adolph Ochs took over the Times,
in 1896, and issued his famous “without fear or favor” declaration, the American
scene was dominated by brazenly partisan newspapers. And the news cultures of
many European nations long ago embraced the notion of competing narratives
for different political communities, with individual newspapers reflecting the views
of each faction. It may not be entirely coincidental that these nations enjoy a
level of political engagement that dwarfs that of the United States.
The transformation will also engender serious losses. By providing what
Bill Keller, of the Times, calls the “serendipitous encounters that are hard to
replicate in the quicker, reader-driven format of a Web site”—a difference that he
compares to that “between a clock and a calendar”—newspapers have helped to
define the meaning of America to its citizens. To choose one date at random, on
the morning of Monday, February 11th, I picked up the paper-and-ink New York
Times on my doorstep, and, in addition to the stories one could have found
anywhere—Obama defeating Clinton again and the Bush Administration’s decision
to seek the death penalty for six Guantánamo detainees—the front page featured
a unique combination of articles, stories that might disappear from our collective
consciousness were there no longer any institution to generate and publish
them. These included a report from Nairobi, by Jeffrey Gettleman, on the effect of
Kenya’s ethnic violence on the country’s middle class; a dispatch from Doha, by
Tamar Lewin, on the growth of American university campuses in Qatar; and, in a
scoop that was featured on the Huffington Post’s politics page and excited much
of the blogosphere that day, a story, by Michael R. Gordon, about the existence
of a study by the RAND Corporation which offered a harsh critique of the Bush
Administration’s performance in Iraq. The juxtaposition of these disparate topics
forms both a baseline of knowledge for the paper’s readers and a picture of the
world they inhabit. In “Imagined Communities” (1983), an influential book on
the origins of nationalism, the political scientist Benedict Anderson recalls Hegel’s
comparison of the ritual of the morning paper to that of morning prayer: “Each
communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated
simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is
confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion.” It is at least
partially through the “imagined community” of the daily newspaper, Anderson
writes, that nations are forged.
Finally, we need to consider what will become of those people, both at
home and abroad, who depend on such journalistic enterprises to keep them
safe from various forms of torture, oppression, and injustice. “People do awful
things to each other,” the veteran war photographer George Guthrie says in
“Night and Day,” Tom Stoppard’s 1978 play about foreign correspondents. “But
it’s worse in places where everybody is kept in the dark.” Ever since James
Franklin’s New England Courant started coming off the presses, the daily newspaper,
more than any other medium, has provided the information that the nation
needed if it was to be kept out of “the dark.” Just how an Internet-based news
culture can spread the kind of “light” that is necessary to prevent terrible things,
without the armies of reporters and photographers that newspapers have
traditionally employed, is a question that even the most ardent democrat in John
Dewey’s tradition may not wish to see answered.
